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TRANSFER OF RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ADULTHOOD WITH ABILITY
OR DISABILITY?

Deborah Rebore* & Perry Zirkel**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires each state to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to all children with disabilities, ages three to
2
1
twenty-one, living within its borders. Under the Act, parents
are entitled to extensive participation in the planning of their
child's education. For example, the student's parent is a required member of the Individualized Education Program (IEP)
3
team. Furthermore, the IDEA provides the student's parent
with several procedural safeguards, including the right to initiate a due process hearing for matters arising under the IDEA,
4
such as issues related to eligibility and services. Indeed, a
* Deborah Rebore is a Graduate Research Fellow at Lehigh University. She
Received her B.A. in 1990 from Colby College and her J.D. from from Catholic University's Columbus School of Law.
** Perry Zirkel is the lacocca Professor of Education at Lehigh University, where
he has served as the dean of College of Education. He has a Ph.D. in Educational Administration, aa J.D. from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Laws from
Yale University. He has written over 750 publications on various aspects of school law
and is a frequent presenter across the country.
1. See 20 U.S. C.§ 1412 (2)(B) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1999).
2. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.20 (1999). "Parent" includes biological and adoptive parents, guardians, a person acting in the place of a parent, surrogate parents, and if permitted by state law, foster parents.
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(1) (1999).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1997). Additionally, parents have the right to examine their
child's records under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1997) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.562(1999),
limit disclosure of records under 34 C.F.R. § 300.571 (1999), and to withhold consent
for an initial evaluation and initial provision of services under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(c)
(1997) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a)(i)-(ii) (1999). As of the 1997 Amendments, parents
have the right to participate in all meetings regarding identification, evaluation,
placement, and FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1997).
33
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parent's involvement in the entire process may significantly influence the type and level of educational services that the student receives.
A potential dilemma regarding a parent's role under the
IDEA arises when the student attains the age of majority.
Generally, age of majority status entitles a person to various
rights, such as the right to vote and to contract. 5 However, attaining the age of majority does not automatically entitle an
IDEA-eligible student to adult rights, at least in terms of educational decision-making. Instead, the IDEA appears to presume that these students do not acquire educational rights. Although the Act, as amended in 1997, permits states to transfer
rights formerly held by the parent to the age of majority student,6 the awkward legislation language seems to suggest that
a student only obtains such rights if the state has enacted
transfer legislation. Further, the general statutory right to
have and control access to educational records, 7 which transfers to all students at the age of eighteen, 8 arguably remains
with the IDEA-parent unless the state has transferred IDEA
rights to the student.9
Surprisingly, little has been written on this topic. 10 One
commentator has addressed the issue twice, once before and
once after the 1997 Amendments. However, both articles are
brief and written in question and answer format, lacking an
in-depth analysis of issues related to the transfer of rights from
parents to age of majority IDEA-eligible students. 11 A third review, written subsequent to the 1997 Amendments, warned of
the potential for litigation in the transfer of rights; but again,
the article is brief and does not examine interrelated issues. 12
5. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.015 (West 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-1-101 (Michie 1999). Although educational decision-making is not typically mentioned, it can be inferred as a matter of common law, unless otherwise provided by
statute.
6. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (1999)
8. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.574(b) (1999).
9. See id. § 300.574(c). On the other hand, the bright-line rule of the FERPA
regulations and the IDEA legislative mandate that states act "in accordance" with
FERPA arguably suggest a contrary conclusion. 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a); 20 U.S.C. §
1417(c).
10. A law review search on Lexis revealed no articles specific to this subject.
11. See Zvi Greismann, Q & A: What Would You Do?, 12 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR
3 (1996); Zvi Greismann, Q & A, 14 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR 6 (1998).
12. See Transferring Rights to 18-Year-Olds Under the New IDEA, 14 THE
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This article provides a current and comprehensive analysis
of the status of age of majority students under the IDEA. Part I
discusses the status of parents, vis-a-vis age of majority students, under the IDEA prior to the 1997 amendments. Part II
analyzes the new relevant provisions in the 1997 amendments
and the 1999 regulations, which allow states to transfer the
procedural rights from parents to age of majority students.
Part III outlines various potential problems that states should
consider when determining whether and how to implement this
transfer of rights.
II. PRE-1997 LAW
Prior to the 1997 amendments, the IDEA was silent with
respect to the procedural rights of age of majority students.
Consequently, states were left without guidance concerning
this perplexing issue. While few states enacted legislation
transferring rights to IDEA-eligible students upon their
reaching the age of majority, 13 others left the issue unresolved.
When disputes concerning the legal status and procedural
rights under IDEA of parents vis-a-vis age of majority students
arose, hearing officers and judges relied on other relevant language in the Act. Notably, there have only been a handful of
published pertinent decisions.
In John H. v. MacDonald, the New Hampshire Federal District Court adopted a partial solution for settling such disputes.14 In this case, the defendant school district did not provide notice of the IEP meeting to either the parents or the
surrogate parent. 15 At the IEP meeting an eighteen year-old
student signed a form consenting to his educational placement.
The school district claimed that because the student had
reached the age of majority in New Hampshire, the parents
were not entitled to notice or to participate in the meeting. 16
The court held that not only "adult students" but also their
parents (including surrogate parents and legal guardians) were

SPECIAL EDUCATOR 5 (1998).

13. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE§ 11.16 (1994) (repealed 1999).
14. 1986-87 EHLR DEC. 558:366 (D.N.H. 1987).
15. See id. at 369.
16. See id. In addition, the district claimed that the parents were not entitled to
notice because a surrogate parent had been appointed to represent the student. The
surrogate appointment lapsed on the student's 18th birthday.
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entitled to the IDEA's procedural safeguards, including the
right to participate in IEP meetings and the right to file for a
due process hearing_17
Although the court did not use the term "transfer" in the
opinion, it simultaneously transferred rights to the student and
allowed rights to remain with the parents. The court's solution
is limited for two reasons. First, the court essentially placed
the age of majority student on an equal footing with the parents. The court did not determine which party would prevail in
the event of a disagreement between them. Second, in light of
the 1997 amendments, the court's decision would not likely be
the same today.18
A few years later, the Second Circuit addressed a similar
situation in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton. 19 In Mrs. C., an IDEA-eligible
student, J.C., who had attained the age of majority, 20 consented
to the termination of his IDEA services. The school district allegedly failed to comply with IDEA's procedural requirements
by not providing J.C.'s parents or his surrogate parent with notice of, or opportunity to participate in, the meeting in which he
agreed with school officials to terminate his IDEA placement.
J.C.'s mother filed suit under the IDEA, challenging the termination decision. 21 The lower court held that since J.C. had attained the age of majority and had not been declared incompetent, his consent was sufficient to terminate the placement,
regardless of whether his mother or his surrogate parent
played a role in the decision. 22 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision. It concluded that Congress
intended for school districts to comply with the statute's procedural requirements with regard to parents as a prerequisite to
changing an eligible student's educational placement. Initially,

17. See id. at 370. The court clarified that both have this right regardless of
whether the other exercised it.
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999); 20 U.S.C.
1232(g) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (1999); 34 C.F.R. § 300.574(b)-(c) (1999).
19. 916 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1990).
20. See id. at 72. This case arose in Connecticut where the age of majority is
eighteen. The student was twenty years old when he consented to the termination of
placement.
21. See id. at 70-71. Although the court opinion did not address the issue of the
mother's standing, J.C. was adopted by his grandparents, and at age four was committed to the Department of Children and Youth Services. Upon J.C.'s return to his
mother's home, at age 20, she became his conservator.
22. See id. at 72.
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the appellate court pointed to the IDEA's procedural safeguard
entitling a parent to notice of any proposed change in the student's IEP. 23 The court went on to explain that "the state cannot terminate an 18-to-21 year-old student's educational
placement on the latter's 'consent' unless the 'consent' is an informed one, i.e., the [IDEA's] procedural safeguards are followed."24 Based on these observations, the court held that in
the absence of procedural compliance, such as notice to the
parents, the student's consent was not informed, and was
therefore not legally effective_25
This decision offers even less assistance than the earlier
New Hampshire case for determining whether IDEA-parent's
rights transfer to an age of majority student. The Mrs. C court
established that school districts must comply with the IDEA's
procedural requirements, such as parental notification, before a
student may provide informed consent regarding an educational placement. However, the court declined to rule on
whether a student's informed consent decision was of any effect. This left open the question of whether the educational
rights transferred to the student, and if these rights are only
partially transferred, would the student's decision override the
parent's?26
In addition to court decisions, a Wisconsin hearing officer
decision has been cited for the proposition that parents still retain procedural rights after an IDEA-eligible student reaches
the age of majority. 27 In Unified School District of De Pere, 28 although state law clearly transferred procedural rights to the
eighteen-year-old student, a hearing officer ruled that the student's parents had standing to appeal the school district's IEP
decision under the IDEA.2 9 This decision, however, relied on
the fact that the parents "filed their appeal prior to [the student's] eighteenth birthday and at that time it was solely their
right to do so." 30 In contrast to the judicial decisions, the hearing officer did not address the issue of parental rights after the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 73.
!d. at 74.
See id. at 73-7 4.
See id.
See, e.g., Greismann, supra note 11.
21 IDELR 1206 (Wis. SEA 1994).
See id. at 1207.
!d. (emphasis in original).
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student reached the age of majority.
Therefore, the law prior to 1997 offered minimal guidance
as to whether the parents' rights transferred to an
IDEA-eligible age of majority student. Moreover, the new provision in the IDEA overrides any guidance offered in the limited applicable case law.
III. 1997 AMENDMENTS AND RESULTING REGULATIONS
The 1997 amendments to the IDEA specifically address the
issue of whether an older IDEA-eligible student is entitled to
rights held by the parent upon reaching the age of majority under state law. Specifically, IDEA 1997 permits states to transfer the parent's rights to the student when the student achieves
the age of majority. 31 Further, in states that elect to provide for
this transfer, the school district must give notice of it to both
the parent and student, via a statement in the IEP, at least one
year prior to the student's attaining the age of majority. 32 Additionally, the district must again give notice to the parents
and the student when the student reaches the age of majority. 33 The amendments also obligate the district to provide both
the parents and the student with other required parental notices, such as notice of IEP meetings, for as long as the student
is IDEA eligible. 34 Finally, the U.S. Department of Education's
accompanying regulations clarify that although parents are
only entitled to notice of IEP meetings, either the student or
the district may invite the parents to attend.35
While the amendments grant states the discretion to determine whether to transfer procedural rights to age of majority students, they also impose two limitations on a state's
authority to do so. First, the amendments categorically exclude
IDEA-eligible students who are incompetent under state law,
from obtaining such rights. 36 Second, via a "special rule," the
amendments similarly exclude students who are otherwise incapable of providing informed consent with respect to educa-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
See
See
See
See

34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a) (1999).

id. § 300.347(c).
id. § 300.517(a).
id. § 300.517(a)(1)(i).
64 Fed. Reg. 12,473 (1999).
34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a) (1999).
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tional decisions. 37
Additionally, for the "special rule" category, the amendments require states that enact transfer statutes to establish
formal procedures for appointing the parent, or another adult,
to represent the student for IDEA purposes. 38 However, by only
cryptically requiring appointment "procedures,"39 IDEA 1997
does not provide any guidance regarding the criteria and methods to use in deciding whether the student has the "ability to
provide informed consent with respect to [her/his] educational
program." 40 The resulting regulations provide some assistance
by clarifying that before a state uses the special rule, it must
have some "mechanism" 41 in place for determining whether a
student is capable of providing informed consent. 42 Further,
the official comments to the regulations provide even greater
specificity by explaining that the type of "mechanism" used to
determine whether a student can provide informed consent is
limited to proceedings for determining "lesser competency." 43
IV. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS
States need to consider certain policy issues regarding the
student's legal status before deciding whether, and how, to
transfer procedural rights to the student. First, a state must
examine its own surrogate parent law, which supplements the
surrogate parent provision in the IDEA, to see if it conforms
with the IDEA transfer provision. Second, a state must determine whether it wants to amend its age of majority definition
to include students who are younger than the established
chronological age but who might be included for other reasons,
like emancipation. Third, states need to be aware of the laws
and procedures regarding incompetence. Fourth, states must
determine whether a mechanism exists for declaring a person
incapable of providing informed consent for a limited purpose

37. See id. § 300.517(b).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. !d.
41. The regulations do not define the type of mechanism needed in order to utilize
the special rule. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(b).
42. See id.
43. For a discussion of the meaning of "lesser competency," see infra notes 66-70
and accompanying text.
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like educational decision making, and if not, whether to create
such a mechanism.
Before grappling with these issues, the initial step is to ascertain whether the age of majority, under state law that applies to all children, is below the age of twenty-one. If the age of
majority in the state is twenty-one, 44 the student will reach the
age of majority when that student's IDEA eligibility ends. Consequently, in such states parents retain their rights under the
IDEA for as long as the child is eligible for FAPE. However, in
the vast majority of states, the age of majority is eighteen. 45 In
these states, lawmakers will have to decide whether to transfer
parental rights to IDEA-eligible age of majority students. The
following subsections address these four specified policy issues
in states where the age of majority is below twenty-one.

A. Students with a Surrogate Parent
Emphasizing the importance of parental involvement in the
student's educational planning, 46 the IDEA defines "parent" to
include a surrogate parent. 47 A surrogate parent is responsible
for representing the student in matters related to the student's
education, which may include identification, evaluation, placement, and F APE. 48 The Act requires the agency responsible for
the student's education49 to appoint a surrogate parent to participate on behalf of the student in the educational planning
where 1) the parents are unknown, 2) the district is unable, after reasonable efforts, to locate the parents, or 3) the child is a
ward of the State_ 5o
Although the IDEA only specifies three situations where a
surrogate parent must be appointed, presumably state law may
add to the list. Indeed, some states require the appointment of
a surrogate parent in specified additional circumstances. 51 For
44. See, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1991 (1998).
45. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.993(a)(2) (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2A-3(B) (Michie 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 8-1-102(a) (Michie 1999).
46. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)(2) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(1)-(2) (1999).
49. The responsible agency varies from state to state. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §
7579.5(b) (Deering 1999) (stating that the LEA is responsible for assigning surrogate
parents); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1161(1) (1999) (stating that the school district is responsible for assigning surrogate parents).
50. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)(1)-(3).
51. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-c:14(II)(e) (1999) (stating that a surro-
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example, New Hampshire protectively provides for the appointment of a surrogate in situations where the parents of an
IDEA-eligible student are "unable to act as the child's advocate
in the educational decision-making process." 52 Other states
permit the appointment of a surrogate parent in certain situations. 53 For example, Connecticut allows for the appointment of
a surrogate if the student is under the supervision of the state
child protection agency.5 4 Finally, some states have included
restrictions. Although it is permissive to appoint a surrogate
parent in Pennsylvania for "good reason," a surrogate parent
will not be appointed in cases where a parent is "simply uncooperative or unresponsive."55
Since a surrogate parent assumes the role of parent for
IDEA purposes, in a state that has chosen to transfer rights to
the student, the assignment of a surrogate parent terminates
upon reaching the age of majority, unless one of the two IDEA
exceptions apply. 56 Some states already require the termination of a surrogate parent assignment on the student's eighteenth birthday. 57 Other states require that the surrogate parent assignment continue beyond the student reaching the age
of majority but only in an advisory capacity. 58 States in this
latter category may need to amend their surrogate appointment procedures in order to conform to the IDEA. Specifically,
gate parent shall be appointed where the parent is otherwise unable to act as the
child's advocate); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit, 18 § 1356(I)(v) (1995) (stating that a surrogate
parent shall be appointed when the parents are disabled); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
03-050-600(1) (1999) (stating that a surrogate parent shall be appointed where the parent is unwilling to ensure that the student's educational needs are being met); 19 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE§ 89.1115(g)(1)(C) (West 1998) (stating that a surrogate parent must be
appointed when a student is committed to the temporary custody of the state).
52. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 186-c:14(II)(c).
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(a) (1999) (stating that a surrogate parent
may be appointed with the parent's consent, where the student is committed to the
temporary custody of the state); 43 S.C. CoDE ANN. REGS. 243(k)(B)(4) (1998) (stating
that a surrogate may be appointed where the parent is unresponsive, lives a far distance from the school, or is in jail, with written authorization from the parent).
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(a) (1997).
55. 22 PA. CODE§ 342.66(a)(II)(A)(2) (1999).
56. For IDEA transfer exceptions see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5(a) (Deering 1999) (a surrogate parent
shall not be appointed for a child who has reached the age of majority, unless declared
incompetent by a court of law); 18 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-80-80(B)(4)(a) (1998) (assignment of a surrogate terminates when the child attains the age of majority); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 41(c)(iv) (Michie 1999) (appointment of a surrogate parent terminates upon the
child attaining the age of majority).
58. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511, r.7-9-1(j) (1998).
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since the IDEA's transfer provision limits the rights of the parent to notice, a parent is not entitled to greater rights, such as
serving in an advisory capacity.
Some states still allow a surrogate parent to continue to
represent the student beyond the age of majority. In these
states the appointment of the surrogate parent will continue if
it appears that the student needs parental assistance beyond
reaching the age of eighteen. 59 In Connecticut, a state where
rights transfer to the student at eighteen, the surrogate parent
remains assigned to the student unless the student objects in
writing. If the student does object, the commissioner of education is required to hold a hearing to determine whether the
surrogate assignment will continue. 60
It appears that state laws that require or permit the surrogate parent assignment to continue beyond the student's eighteenth birthday would be in contravention of IDEA 1997 in
states, such as Connecticut, which have transferred rights to
the student. In addition, such laws treat age of majority students with surrogate parents differently than those without
surrogate parents who will obtain IDEA rights unless incompetent or incapable of providing informed consent. Thus, states
should examine their surrogate parent law in tandem with any
proposed transfer of rights legislation to make sure that they
are compatible.

B. Students Who Are Younger than Eighteen But Legally
Independent
The transfer of IDEA rights is permissible when the student attains the age of majority. The Act's requirement that a
statement of the transfer be included in the student's IEP one
year prior to reaching the age of majority presumes that age of
majority status is achieved upon reaching a certain age. However, in some states a child who is younger than the chronological age defined as the age of majority may still be considered to have reached it. For example, in Alaska a person who

59. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:l4(1V) (1999) (stating that the appointment of a surrogate may be extended by the commissioner until child graduates or
reaches 21); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1115(g)(1)(E) (West 1998) (stating that appointment of a surrogate can continue up until the student turns 22 if necessary to ensure FAPE).
60. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(b) (1997).
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has married has attained the age of majority. 61 As a result,
IDEA-eligible married students in Alaska would be included in
the group of eligible age of majority students, regardless of
their chronological age.
Another group of students that are below the age of majority but have greater rights than other children are emancipated minors. 62 Although the definition of emancipated minor
varies from state to state, a child is generally considered to be
emancipated based on circumstances such as being married or
in the armed services, maintaining a separate residence with
no intention of returning to the parental home, or achieving financial independence. 63 Under state law, emancipated minors
may be considered to have reached the age of majority in order
to consent to medical treatment, to enter into a contract, or to
enroll in school. 64 However, emancipated minors are not entitled to all of the rights granted to an age of majority person.
Some rights, like the right to vote, are based exclusively on
chronological age. An emancipated minor will not be permitted
to exercise such chronologically based rights until reaching the
statutory age. The procedures used to determine whether a
child is an emancipated minor also vary from state to state. In
some states a child must be declared an emancipated minor via
a court proceeding. 65 In other states, no such proceeding exists.
Instead, public agencies determine whether a child should be
considered an emancipated minor for a specific purpose, like
receiving public assistance.66
Whether through a legal determination or otherwise, states
should ascertain whether their age of majority definition includes "independent" children who are married or otherwise
emancipated minors. If the definition does not include such
61. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.993(a)(2) (1999).
62. For an in·depth discussion of various issues regarding emancipation of minors, see, for example, William E. Dean, Ireland v. Ireland: Judicial Emancipation of

Minors in Idaho: Protecting the Best Interest of the Child or Conferring a Windfall
Upon Parents? 31 IDAHO L. REV. 205 (1994); Gregory A. Loken, "Thrownaway" Children and Throwaway Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1715 (1995); Carol Sanger & Elanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modem Times, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 239 (1992).
63. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 145.62 (1999); JAMES M. MORRISSEY, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN NEW YORK: A GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS & HUMAN
SERVICE PROVIDERS 18-19 (3d ed. 1997).
64. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 25-5-25 (Michie 1999).
65. See, id. § 25-5-26.
66. See, e.g., MORRISSEY, supra note 63, at 18-19.
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children, states should consider whether to amend their existing definitions. In the event that an "independent" minor has
not attained the age of majority, states should consult their
surrogate parent law to determine whether a surrogate parent
must be appointed to represent the student for IDEA purposes.

C. Students Who are Determined to Be Incompetent
Even when a state has established the procedural rights
will transfer to an age of majority student, the IDEA prohibits
transfer to students who are declared incompetent under state
law. 6 7 Legal incompetence is defined by state law and varies
from state to state. Typically, the definition includes the incapacity to make responsible decisions due to mental or physical
disabilities or illnesses, or due to drug addiction or inebriety. 68
Regardless of any state differences in defining incompetence, an elevated standard of clear and convincing proof of incompetence is generally required since fundamental liberty interests are at stake. 69 Thus, petitioning parents or petitioning
school districts should be prepared to present persuasive evidence of the student's incompetence in various aspects of life. If
the student is found to be incompetent, then either a parent or
a surrogate parent must represent the student for as long as
the student remains IDEA-eligible.

D. Students Who are Unable to Provide Informed Consent
IDEA's special rule requires the appointment of a "parent"
to represent an age of majority student when the student is determined incapable of providing informed consent. 70 The regulations also require that a mechanism for determining informed consent be in place in order for a state to use the special
rule. 71 The type of mechanism is a matter of state law. Arguably, a state may require a court to make a legal determination
of "lesser" competency or, may permit a less formal procedure
where an IEP team or hearing examiner makes the determina-

67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3) (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-26-01(2) (1999); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 342.66(11) (West 1998).
69. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 1801.3(e) (Deering 1999).
70. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999).
71. See id. § 300.517(b).
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tion. 72
In the event that a state requires a court to make a legal
determination of lesser competency, the student is most likely
entitled to the same rights as a person in a full competency
proceeding. 73 Court proceedings which permit a finding of
"lesser" competence already exist in most states. 74 In such proceedings, the court makes a finding limited to a specific area
like education. In addition, the court typically not only determines incompetence but also appoints a "limited" guardian or
conservator. 75
However, a state may chose to institute a less formal procedure for determining whether a student can provide informed
consent regarding educational decisions. Presently, at least one
state, Idaho, allows for a less formal procedure than a legal
lesser-competency proceeding to determine whether a student
is capable of providing informed consent. In Idaho, rights
transfer to the student at age eighteen unless the student is incompetent or "an individualized education program team determines the student lacks the ability to provide informed consent with respect to his educational program."7 6
Although Congress probably intended a less formal procedure than a court proceeding to determine whether a student is
capable of providing informed consent with regard to educational decisions, an IEP team determination may be too informal. One possible compromise may be to define the mechanism
to be used for the special rule as a due process hearing. However, as with most issues relating to transfer of rights, this
policy matter is left to state control.
V. CONCLUSION

In practice, states may be more concerned with an array of
other special education topics, 77 including discipline 78 and re72. Generally, the word competency implies a judicial proceeding. However, assuming that Congress did not intend for parents to obtain a court order to use the "special rule," a less formal procedure may be appropriate.
73. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 1801.3(d).
74. See id.; FLA. STAT. ch. 744.102(8)(a) (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3)
(1998).
75. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(3) (Michie 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE §
1801.3(d). FLA. STAT. ch. 744.102(8)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3).
76. IDAHO CODE§ 33-2002(4) (1998).
77. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Law Update VI, 133 ED. LAW REP.
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imbursement disputes. 79 As a result some states neglect to address the issue of whether to transfer rights to IDEA-eligible
age-of- majority students. Although the transfer provision may
only impact a small number of students, its effect may be significant to all parties involved. Specifically, a state's silence is
likely to cause confusion and friction for school districts, parents, and students as to the rights of parents vis-a-vis age of
majority students. Parents in support of the claim that they retain their IDEA-rights will point to the IDEA, which arguably
preserves their rights unless state law transfers such rights to
student. Conversely, student advocates will assert that legally
competent adult students are entitled to make their own educational decisions independent of their parents. The existing
case law does not lend any further assistance regarding this
matter. In the absence of state legislation, tension and disagreement over each party's role will continue, which is not in
anyone's best interest, including that of the so-called "child".

323 (1999). The previous five updates appeared at 116 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1997), 98 ED.
LAW REP. 1 (1995), 83 ED. LAW REP. 543 (1993), 66 ED. LAW REP. 901 (1991), 56 ED.
LAW REP. 20 (1990).
78. See, e.g., Joseph R. McKinney, Disciplining Children With(Out) Disabilities:
Schools Behind the Eight Ball, 130 ED. LAW REP. [365] (1999); Perry A. Zirkel, The
IDEA's Suspension/ Expulsion Requirements, 134 ED.LAW REP. 19 (1999).
79. See, e.g., Cindy L. Skaruppa eta!., Tuition Reimbursement for Parent's Unilateral Placement of Students in Private Institutions: Justified or Not? 114 ED .. LAW
REP. 353 (1997). Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition Reimbursement for Special Education Students, 7 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 122 (1997).

